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Abstract 
The European Union coordinates and encourages Member State actions to combat poverty, and to 
reform their social protection systems on the basis of policy exchanges and mutual learning (‘best 
practices’). Some EU countries are more effective in poverty reduction than others. What can 
explain these variations in effectiveness? This paper analyzes the effectiveness of social transfers in 
alleviating poverty. We focus on EU15 countries, but also include other OECD countries in our 
analysis. We compare poverty rates at the levels of market and disposable incomes, that is before 
and after transfers, in order to analyze the effect of tax and transfer policies in reducing poverty, 
i.e. to determine the target efficiency of social transfers. We perform several tests with the most 
recent data (LIS, OECD, SOCX, and Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC). Finally, we perform several partial 
analyses by disaggregating poverty rates to socioeconomic and demographic conditions in order to 
investigate to what extent variations at the social program level (such as old age pensions, child 
benefits) affect the measured effectiveness of the welfare state in alleviating poverty.  
Empirical results draw heavily on how pensions are treated - as primary income or as transfer. We 
find a strong relationship between levels of social spending and antipoverty effects of social 
transfers and taxes across EU15 countries. Social spending seems to be an important determinant 
of a country’s poverty outcome, especially among the elderly, when pensions are considered as 
transfers. Our analysis highlights some cross-country differences in targeting of social expenditures 
on poverty alleviation in EU15 and non-EU15 countries around 2005. We introduce an indicator of 
Public Policy Effectiveness on Poverty Alleviation across countries. Each percentage point of social 
expenditure alleviates poverty in both EU15 and non-EU15 countries by .7 percentage points on 
average. Relatively high scores in EU15 countries are found for Ireland and Scandinavian countries, 
while Italy, Greece and Spain score lowest. Outside Europe the poorest scores are reported for 
Korea and the USA. Country ranking appears to be rather stable over time when outcomes for 
1995 and 2005 are compared, although some of our results may be sensitive to cyclical factors. 
Finally, we analyzed poverty among vulnerable age groups. Our results show that family programs 
and child support alleviate poverty among children to a large extent, especially in non-EU15 
countries. For public and private old age pension and survivors schemes we find no effect on 
poverty in case pensions are considered as transfers (both in EU15 and non-EU15 countries). 
However, this picture changes completely when pensions are counted as transfers. In that case the 
poverty rate among elderly in EU15 falls from 90 to 21 percent through taxes and social transfers!  
 
JEL-codes: H53, H55, I32 
Keywords:  poverty, welfare states, Lisbon objectives, social indicators
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty alleviation has been a European objective already since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In 
2000 the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic growth social cohesion should 
be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). The open method of coordination was introduced 
as the means of spreading best practices and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU-
goals. Social indicators were developed to monitor the improvements with respect to social 
cohesion.  
The Lisbon Agenda has renewed the interest in poverty alleviation across member states. However, 
still a sizable proportion of the EU15 population lives in poverty (17 percent), although both 
poverty structure and poverty rates vary across countries from 10 percent in the Netherlands to 
about 20 percent in Greece, Italy and Spain. Moreover, the average at-risk-of-poverty rates – an 
official EU social cohesion indicator – even have risen since the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda. 
Some EU15 countries are more effective in poverty reduction than others. What can explain these 
variations in effectiveness? Obviously, a range of policy strategies may be chosen to tackle 
poverty, including improving educational outcomes, improving job opportunities and stimulating 
labor force participation and reducing inequalities in health outcomes.  
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of income transfer policies in EU15 countries in alleviating 
poverty.1 To indicate whether European economic integration may have had any impact on poverty 
reduction, we also include several non-EU15 countries in our analysis as a benchmark. We compare 
poverty rates at the levels of market and disposable incomes, that is before and after taxes and 
social transfers, in order to analyze the effect of tax and transfer policies in reducing poverty, i.e. 
to determine the target efficiency of social transfers. We will perform several tests with data from 
LIS, OECD, SOCX and Eurostat (ECHP/EU-SILC) and confront our results with earlier findings on 
cross-country poverty research. This kind of cross-country comparisons may guide us to cross-
country differences on poverty alleviation in the EU15. Finally, we will perform several partial 
analyses by disaggregating poverty rates to socioeconomic and demographic conditions in order to 
investigate to what extent variations at the social program level (such as old age pensions, child 
benefits) affect the measured effectiveness of the welfare state in alleviating poverty.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the effect of Europeanization of social 
policies on poverty alleviation. In section 3 we present the research design. Next (section 4), we 
turn to the reduction of poverty rates through taxes and transfers and its relationship to welfare 
state effort. Finally (section 5), we look at two vulnerable age groups: children and the elderly. We 
present linkages across countries of their poverty rates with expenditures for several social 
programs such as family and child benefits, and public and private old age pensions and survivor 
schemes. Section 6 closes the paper.  
 
 
2. POLICY ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
 
2.1 Europeanization of social policies 
Member states of the EU are still autonomous when it comes to the design and generosity of their 
social protection systems. Still, member states have accepted a certain degree of commitment in 
terms of social protection. This commitment is embodied in two recommendations accepted by the 
European Council in 1992. The first recommendation, of June 1992, dealt with common criteria 
concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems (92/441/EEC). 
The second recommendation, of July 1992, addressed the “convergence of social protection 
objectives and policies” (92/442/EEC). The motivation was that convergence seeks to guarantee 
the continuation and stimulate the development of social protection within the context of the 
completion of the internal market. And also, that member states face common problems, such as 
ageing of the population, unemployment, changing family structures and poverty; common 
objectives must act as pointers to the way social protection systems are modified to take account 
                                                 
1 The paper of Beblavy (2009) analyses social protection expenditure and poverty profiles for the new EU 
member states. 
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of these problems. 
A new and important step was taken at the European Council in Lisbon 2000. For the EU, the 
strategic goal was set that is become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy with sustainable economic growth and greater social cohesion before (the decade ending 
in) 2010. The economic and social agendas were thus explicitly coupled. To achieve these aims, the 
social model needs to be modernized. To ensure long-term sustainability of the social security 
systems in the light of the ageing process, participation rates should be increased.  
The Treaty of Nice of 2001 took the social agenda further. It was agreed to advance social policy 
on the basis of the open method of coordination, first employed with respect to employment 
policies. The method recognizes that social policy remains the responsibility of member states, 
under the principle of subsidiarity. It implies that member states define and evaluate common 
objectives and learn from each about reaching these objectives. Best practices are disseminated 
and benchmarking is used. Coordination is based on evaluation and peer pressure, but does not 
offer the option of sanctions. In Nice it was decided that member states should implement action 
plans for combating poverty and social exclusion and to define common objectives on social 
indicators. The indicators encompass financial poverty, income inequality, long-term 
unemployment, regional variation in employment rates, life expectancy and poor health.  
Some consider these common indicators and the national action plans for social inclusion as 
significant progress towards integration along the social dimension (Atkinson, 2002). Others 
question this form of coordination (Leibfried, 2002). At least, this new mode of governance and the 
Lisbon agenda in general, have renewed the debate on poverty reduction in EU member states. 
 
2.2 Combating poverty  
In September/October 2006, member states adopted renewed National Action Plans for Social 
Inclusion under the new streamlined open method of coordination as one chapter of the National 
Report on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion. They presented the key priorities in 
member states efforts to promote greater social inclusion and make a decisive impact on the 
eradication of poverty and social exclusion (European Commission, 2007). A year later, the 
Commission gave special attention to the poverty among vulnerable groups, especially children, in 
their Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008 (European Commission, 2008). In 
most member states, children are at greater risk of poverty than the overall population. In some 
countries more than 25 percent of the children are at risk of poverty. Child poverty may have a 
strong damaging effect on future life opportunities and also on the future capacity of these children 
to contribute to society (European Commission 2008, p.6). In general, the Report indicates that 
social inclusion and social protection remains high on the political agenda for most member states. 
Some member states have reinforced their commitments by setting quantitative targets to reduce 
poverty (p. 101). The most recent Joint Report 2009 (European Commission 2009, pp. 2-3) states 
that a boost must be given to Member States' efforts to implement comprehensive strategies 
against poverty. The current Social Open Method of Coordination Cycle lasts until 2010, the target 
year for the Lisbon strategy. The Report calls upon strong commitment to achieve the agreed 
objectives on social protection and social inclusion, and the 2010 European Year for combating 
poverty and social exclusion reaffirms this. 
Progress of social inclusion and poverty reduction is monitored considering the performance in each 
member state on the basis of national indicators, based on the Social Indictors report of Atkinson 
et al (2002). In the European Union people are said to be in income poverty if their incomes are 
below 60 per cent of the median disposable income of households in their country, after adjusting 
for household size (equivalence scales).2 Based on this EU-criterion, the proportion of the EU15-
                                                 
2 The evolution of the European Union will lead increasingly to question poverty-issues in an EU-wide 
perspective, about both Europe–wide data and the underlying concepts (Atkinson, 2002, p. 626). Up till now 
EU-wide estimates of poverty play no role. A paper of Brandolini (2006) provides the first estimates of 
poverty in the enlarged European Union as if it was a single country. European Commission–Eurostat (2008) 
show estimates applying an EU median income as threshold. In 2005 around 16 percent of total population of 
Europe had a income below 60 percent of the national median level in the country in which they live, which is 
the weighted average of the figures for the risk of poverty at national level across the EU (i.e. the indicator 
used in the OMC in the field of social protection and social inclusion). However, around 22.5 percent of the EU 
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population who was at risk of poverty in 2007 is 17 percent, with lower statistics for the Nordic 
countries and higher poverty rates for Mediterranean countries. See Map 1. In EU15 around 54 
million citizens are considered as at risk of poverty. 
 
Map 1: At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers (PL 60), 2007 
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Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009) 
 
 
The poverty problem is also striking in other highly-developed welfare states. Industrialized 
countries spend a large share of their income on social security, but poverty and social exclusion 
have not been eradicated. A sizeable proportion of the population lives in economic poverty in all 
industrial welfare states. According to the most common standards used in international poverty 
analyses, on average roughly one in ten households live in relative poverty in OECD countries (cf. 
Atkinson et al. 1995; Behrendt 2002; Smeeding, 2005). The persistence of poverty in industrial 
welfare states calls for an explanation. If these welfare states offer elaborate systems of income 
maintenance, why is there still a considerable amount of poverty? Why are some countries more 
effective than others in this respect? What can explain these variations in effectiveness?  
 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
This paper assesses the relationship between welfare state effort and poverty alleviation. We 
analyze the reduction of poverty rates through social transfers and taxes and its relationship to 
welfare state effort. Our research design starts with the data to be used, because poverty rates 
and social expenditure rates can be collected from several sources. Next, we discuss how to 
measure social effort and the effect of social transfers on poverty. 
 
3.1 Measuring poverty incidence 
For various reasons we use poverty rates from different databases. The official EU-indicator for 
social cohesion is the at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers. This rate is defined as the share 
of persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set 
at 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income in each country. For this 
indicator, Eurostat data (ECHP/EU-SILC) are available for the period 1995-2007, but not for all 
member states. For a further comparison, we will also use OECD poverty rates. The OECD poverty 
rate is usually defined as the proportion of individuals with equivalized disposable income less than 
50 percent of the median income. In this paper, we will use OECD poverty data from the mid-
1990’s until the year 2005 based onthe OECD study (2008) entitled ‘Growing unequal? Income 
distribution and poverty in OECD countries’. Finally, we use data from the Luxembourg Income 
                                                                                                                                                        
population had an income below 60 percent of the EU median level of disposable income. See European 
Commission–Eurostat (2008, pp. 20-21). 
- 3 - 
Study (LIS). The LIS database contains income data files for 32 nations covering the period 1967 
to 2005. With this data set we can also analyze both the level and trend in poverty for a 
considerable period across a wide range of nations.  
Following international standards, we use the relative rather than the absolute approach in 
measuring income poverty. This means that we define those households that have an equivalent 
disposable income below a certain threshold representing the level of well-being of the population 
in a specific country as being poor. In our empirical analysis we use several thresholds for a 
poverty line (40 percent, 50 percent and 60 percent), because the absolute number as well as the 
structure of poverty differ to a large extent, depending on the threshold chosen.3 In most 
comparative studies the poverty threshold has been set at 50 percent of median equivalent 
disposable income, but we focus especially on the EU’s definition of the poverty line. For 
comparison, the official United States poverty line was just about 30 percent of median United 
States disposable post-tax household income in 2007.4+5 
It should be noted that there have been controversial arguments regarding the issues in the 
measurement of poverty. These arguments have their own merits and shortcomings, and there has 
been little professional consensus among research with regard to the theoretical superiority of a 
particular way of measuring poverty (Haveman, 2008). Moreover, the availability of reliable data 
restricts the possibilities for conducting empirical research, which is especially problematic in cross-
national studies. The aim of this paper is not to review definitional issues that arise in assessing the 
extent of, and change in, poverty in western industrialized countries. We simply refer to a vast 
literature on the sensitivity of measured results to the choice of income definitions, poverty lines, 
appropriate equivalence scales, and other elements that may affect results in comparative poverty 
research.6  
 
3.2 Measuring social effort 
The overall result of quantitative studies seems to be that there is strong negative correlation 
between poverty and social expenditures across European countries over the last 25 years; see 
among many others Cantillon (2009), Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009), Behrendt (2002), and 
Kenworthy (1999). We use social expenditure data from the most recent OECD Social Expenditure 
Database (SOCX 2008). This database contains aggregate and disaggregated data on social 
expenditures. The main social policy areas included are old age, survivors, family, health and other 
social programs. Both cash benefits and benefits in kind are included. In this study, we will perform 
several tests at the aggregate level and at the program level. It should be noted that social 
expenditure indicators at the aggregate level have their limitations (Kühner, 2007): changes in 
expenditure ratio’s may not be caused by policy changes, but simply by the number of beneficiaries 
as a result of an ageing population or changes in unemployment levels due to cyclical factors (see 
also section 3.4).  
We distinguish between EU15 and other countries to indicate whether it is Europeanization rather 
                                                 
3  Hagenaars and De Vos (1987) applied eight definitions for a poverty line to a 1983 household survey for the 
Netherlands: four definitions based on an absolute approach, three on a subjective and one a relative 
measure. The derived overall poverty rates ranged from 5.7 to 33.5 percent. 
4 U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey reports for 2007 a poverty threshold for a 4-persons family 
(weighted average) of $21,203; median disposable income for 4-persons families amounts $69,654. 
5  Although US poverty is much higher than poverty in Europe when a relative poverty measure is used, using 
the official absolute poverty measurement from the US (Orshansky-poverty) alters the picture; see Notten 
and De Neubourg (2007). Their estimates according to the Orshansky-methodology for 1996 and 2000 show 
(still) high USA poverty rates, but not that much difference with most European countries, while Greece, 
Spain and Portugal even have figures four times higher than the USA. It should be noted that this result is 
highly sensitive for the purchasing power parity rates used to convert the US poverty lines to country specific 
thresholds of EU15.  
6  Among others, see Atkinson (1987 and 2003), Hagenaars and De Vos (1987), Förster (1993), Atkinson et al 
(1995), Behrendt (2000), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997 and 2000), Smeeding et al (2000), Marcus and 
Danziger (2000), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), Caminada and Goudswaard (2001), Förster and Pearson 
(2002), Smeeding (2005), Guio (2005), Förster and Mira d’Ercole (2005), OECD (2008) and (other) papers 
listed in our reference section using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Recent comprehensive reviews 
on methodological assumptions underlying international levels and trends in inequality are found in Brandolini 
and Smeeding (2007 and 2008). See Bourguignon et al (2002) for a more elaborated paper on the evaluation 
of poverty impact of economic policies.  
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than globalization that has had any impact on poverty alleviation (and/or social expenditures).7 
Other problems with social expenditure as an indicator for differences in social protection across 
countries are related to differences in the public/private mix in the provision of social protection 
and differences in features of the tax system. Adema (2001) has developed indicators that aim at 
measuring the share of an economy’s domestic production recipients of social benefits really draw 
on, net total social expenditure. We prefer to use these net social expenditure ratios rather than 
gross ratios. Unfortunately, net figures are not available at the level of social programs, so we also 
have to use gross social expenditure ratios to that end. However, we include private social benefits. 
For private programs to be considered ‘social’, they need to have a social purpose and contain an 
element of interpersonal redistribution and/or compulsory participation.8 The distinction between 
public and private social protection is made on the basis of whoever controls the relevant financial 
flows. Private social benefits may be important for our analysis. In so far they contain an element 
of redistribution, they may also have an impact on poverty reduction across countries. For 
example, private but mandatory pensions (in the second pillar) may have an effect on poverty 
incidence among the elderly. However, the impact of private social benefits is likely to be smaller 
than the impact of public social transfers.  
The most recent figures of the net social expenditure as percentage of GDP, based on the 2008 
edition of the Net Social Expenditure data, indicate that accounting for the impact of taxes and of 
private social expenditure has an equalizing effect on levels of social effort across countries; see 
Caminada and Goudswaard (2005) for details. 
 
3.3 Measuring the anti poverty effects of taxes and social transfers 
Usually, the impact of social policy on income poverty is calculated in line with the work of 
Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. Important issues 
of tax/transfer shifting and behavioral responses are ignored.9 A standard analysis of the anti-
poverty effect of taxes and income transfers is to compare pre-tax-transfer poverty and post-tax-
transfer poverty (Ringen, 1987; see also OECD 2008, p. 98). To compare the antipoverty 
effectiveness of taxes and income transfers among western welfare states, poverty rates will be 
decomposed into the level of market-generated poverty, the overall level of welfare efforts, and the 
poverty reduction efficiency of taxes and transfers (cf. Kim, 2000a). When calculating poverty rates 
for both market and disposable income, people are ranked by their disposable incomes, so that the 
re-ranking effect is eliminated.  
A comparison between the standard at-risk-of-poverty rate and the hypothetical situation where 
social transfers are absent, other things being equal, shows that such transfers have an important 
redistributive effect that helps to reduce the number of people who are at risk of poverty.10 In the 
absence of all social transfers, the average poverty risk for EU member states would be 
considerably higher than it is in reality. It should however be noted that the indicator of poverty 
risk before social transfers must be interpreted with caution (Kim, 2000b; Nell; 2005). First, it is 
not taken into account that instruments other than social cash transfers can have the effect of 
raising the disposable incomes of households and individuals, namely transfers in kind, tax credits 
and tax allowances. Second, the pre-transfer poverty risk is compared to the post-transfer risk 
keeping all other things equal – namely, assuming unchanged household and labor market 
structures, thus disregarding any possible behavioral changes that the situation of absence of 
social transfers would involve. However, behavioral responses – with the strongest effects on 
reducing work effort - have been at the heart of the policy debates shaping the evolution of 
                                                 
7  It should be mentioned that some non-EU15 countries such as Czech Republic, Iceland, Hungary, Norway, 
Poland, Slovakia, or Switzerland may also be influenced by European integration, for example via policy 
competition.  
8  Private social programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory private benefits are often incapacity 
related. For example, in several countries employers are obliged to provide sickness benefits. Occupational 
injuries and accidents (‘risque professionel’) can also be covered by mandatory private insurances. A number 
of EU member states have supplementary employment-based pension plans with mandatory contributions, 
based on a funding system. Voluntary private social security covers a wide range of programs, of which 
private pension plans and private social health insurance constitute major components. 
9 See for a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al (1987). 
10 Among others, see Behrendt (2002), Smeeding (2005), Förster and Pearson (2002), Guio (2005) and 
Förster and Mira d’Ercole (2005). 
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antipoverty policy.11 Kim (2000b) showed that both the generosity and efficiency of the 
tax/transfer system may influence the level of pre-tax-transfer poverty. So, this standard approach 
overestimates the antipoverty effectiveness of generous and/or targeted welfare systems. Our 
estimates for effectiveness of poverty reduction of each country should consequently be regarded 
as upper bounds.  
A special feature in our analysis is a technique for treatment of pensions. Public pension plans are 
generally seen as part of the safety net, generating large antipoverty effects through transfers and 
taxes (contributions) at one moment in time. A case in point arises when considering contributions 
to private and occupational pensions and their relation to contributions to public pensions, 
especially because countries differ to a large extent in public versus private provision of their 
pensions (OECD, 2008, p. 120). Private occupational pensions are not antipoverty programs per 
se, although they too have a significant effect on poverty reduction when pre-tax-transfer poverty 
and post-tax-transfer poverty are measured at one moment in time, particularly among the elderly 
(Scholtz et al, 2008; Wu, 2005). One could question whether pensions are designed to mitigate the 
most pernicious aspects of market-based economic outcomes (and thus part of society’s safety 
net). Nevertheless, the standard approach treats contributions to government pensions as a tax 
that finances the retirement pensions paid out in the same year, while contributions to private 
pensions are effectively treated as a form of private consumption. This affects international 
comparisons of antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes. Overcoming this bias requires a 
normative approach: should pensions be earmarked as market income or as a transfer? We deal 
with this bias rather pragmatically by broadening the traditional framework of statutory incidence 
analysis. We also compute the antipoverty effect of taxes and social transfers other than pension. 
Recent data of Eurostat allow for such a (new) approach. Comparing at-risk-of-poverty rates with 
and without pensions identifies the partial effect neglected thus far in this kind of statutory 
incidence analysis.12 
 
3.4 Tests on the linkages between social protection and poverty reduction 
National preferences for social protection differ substantially across countries. Especially Anglo-
Saxon countries do not seem to be prepared to sustain the high protection levels prevailing in 
other countries with the same level of income. This may be an expression of cultural differences 
within the group of OECD countries. These differences could point to variance in the antipoverty 
nature of social systems as well. Anglo-Saxon welfare states (especially the United States) rely 
more heavily on private social arrangements as far as pensions, health care and other programs 
are concerned. However, private social programs may generate a more limited redistribution of 
resources than public ones, and tax advantages towards private pension and health plans are more 
likely to benefit the rich. Private employment-related social benefits mostly re-allocate income 
between the (formerly) employed populations. The same holds for fiscal advantages related to, for 
example, supplementary private pension plans. In general, we do expect that private schemes will 
generate less antipoverty effects than public programs. 
We perform a cross-national analysis of the relationship between (public and private) social 
expenditures and poverty rate reduction through transfers ant taxes at one moment in time. The 
material presented is only descriptive and does not explain poverty alleviation or poverty structure. 
Such an analysis should ideally be based on a theory, which would have to address at least the 
following cross-national differences (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000, p.263): differences in 
labor markets that affect earnings of individual household members; demographic differences, such 
as the ageing of the population and growth of single parent households, which affect both family 
needs and labor market decisions; and differences across countries in tax and transfers policies 
that not only affect family income directly, but also may affect work and investment decisions. Two 
                                                 
11 We refer to the seminal review by Danziger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981). 
12  An alternative approach to overcome this bias is to re-rank incomes (cf. OECD, 2008, p.109). First, poverty 
rate of market income is computed by ranking people by their level of market income, and the antipoverty 
effect of the tax and transfer systems is calculated. In the second step, poverty rate of market income is 
based on people ranked by their disposable income (i.e. individuals are ranked by where they end up “after” 
redistribution, rather than where they were placed “before”). The difference between the two measures of 
redistribution is a result of the re-ranking of some households as a consequence of welfare state programs 
(for example pensions). 
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recent seminal books edited by Kakwani and Silber (2007 and 2008) present the panorama of the 
many dimensions of poverty from various disciplines. A fully-fledged model should be developed to 
assess the relative performance of social factors and the economic development. Such a 
comprehensive approach is far beyond the scope of this paper.13 Here we simply employ bi-variate 
regressions on the relationship between poverty reduction through the transfer and tax system and 
levels of social expenditures.14 However, we will investigate the relationship between poverty 
alleviation and social expenditures across countries at several moments in time (around 1995, 
2000 and 2005) to analyze the influence of the business cycle. Nevertheless one could argue that 
omitted (macroeconomic) variables cause bias. Differences in social effort across countries at one 
point in time can be the result of numerous factors. 
It should however be mentioned that the European Union have emphasized the multidimensional 
nature of deprivation, and have developed supplementary indicators of poverty based on social 
indicators and the broad concept of social exclusion. The European Union has defined common 
objectives on social indicators to be benchmarked by the streamlined Open Method of Coordination. 
Both data and measurement techniques have been developed in order to capture a variety of 
dimensions of deprivation beyond money income (poverty). Another important point to keep in 
mind is that we only analyze the impact of transfers on poverty, while, as we mentioned before, 
several other strategies can be chosen to alleviate poverty. In fact, several EU member states are 
increasingly emphasizing strategies to facilitate labor force participation of lower income groups 
(European Commission, 2008, p.101). This may also be an effective strategy to tackle poverty. 
 
 
4. ANTIPOVERTY EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRANSFERS AND TAXES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In spite of differences in the measurement of poverty and the databases used, most studies have 
consistently found that there is a large difference in poverty rates among welfare states, depending 
on the poverty line applied. Reports on poverty profiles for EU15 and other OECD countries for the 
latest data year available from LIS (2009), OECD (2008) and Eurostat (2009) consistently show – 
in general - Scandinavian and Benelux countries have the lowest poverty rates, followed by 
continental European countries. Anglo Saxon welfare states have relatively higher poverty rates. 
Among them, the level of poverty is highest in the United States.15 However, country clustering 
based on poverty rates is quite different from that of welfare state regimes. Among the countries 
with low poverty rates we find representatives of the social democratic regime and the corporatist 
regime. Likewise, the nations with higher rates of poverty represent several regime types and both 
members of the EU15 and the new member states. 
In every nation, benefits from governments, net of taxes, reduce relative income poverty. The first 
columns of Table 1 show relative poverty rates calculated for household market income and for 
disposable income after transfers and taxes. We compare the different at risk-of-poverty rates 
before and after social transfers and taxes. In each country, these rates are calculated with the 
same threshold, namely the nationally-defined 60 percent threshold calculated on the basis of total 
household income. Remarkably, according to the EU-indicator, poverty increased on average 
                                                 
13  The multidimensional approach of poverty is a complex undertaking (Haveman, 2008, p. 4) and suffers from 
several difficulties, among which the most serious is the estimation of the interaction between attributes 
(dimensions of poverty). One has to define a list of attributes to be taken into account and decide how much 
weight to give to each of these dimensions. Thorbecke (2007, p. 17-18) concludes: “It should be clear that 
a complete mapping of combination of attributes into the utility space appears daunting, if not altogether 
utopian.” “…, there are too many unresolved questions left over to consider seriously using multidimensional 
measures in any truly operational sense.” 
14  We refer to related work. Caminada and Goudwaard (2010) perform a multiple analysis on poverty and 
social expenditures in a cross country perspective. We take into account the most commonsense (control) 
variables to be examined: the ratio of the elderly population (for old age pensions), the unemployment rate 
of total labor force (for the business cycle), and GDP per capita US dollars (current prices and PPS). 
15  See Caminada and Goudswaard (2010) for a review. Data on poverty rates and poverty alleviation among 
28 OECD countries, and correlation tests (relationship with social income transfers) are posted at and 
available from Caminada’s webpage.  
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between 2000 and 2007, especially in Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain.16 
When analyzing the hypothetical case of the complete absence of social transfers (other than 
pensions), in EU15 countries an average of 26 percent of the population would be at-risk-of-
poverty. Note that in the EU data retirement and survivor's pensions are usually counted as income 
before transfers and not as social transfers, because the prime role of old age (and survivors’) 
pensions is not to re-distribute income across individuals but rather over the life-cycle of 
individuals. Alternatively, pensions could be excluded from at risk of poverty rates ”before social 
transfers and taxes”; those figures are presented between brackets in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: EU at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers and taxes, 1995-2007 
 
 
Poverty rates before social transfers and 
taxes 
Poverty rates after transfers and 
taxes 
  1995 2000 2007 1995 2000 2007 
Austria 24 (41) 22 (37) 25 (43) 13 12 12 
Belgium 27 (42) 23 (40) 28 (42) 16 13 15 
Denmark      27 (37) 10  12 
Finland    19 (32) 29 (41)  11 13 
France 26 (42) 24 (41) 26 (46) 15 16 13 
Germany 22 (38) 20 (39) 25 (43) 15 10 15 
Greece 23 (38) 22 (39) 24 (42) 22 20 20 
Ireland 34 (42) 31 (37) 33 (40) 19 20 18 
Italy 23 (40) 21 (42) 24 (43) 20 18 20 
Luxembourg 25 (40) 23 (39) 23 (39) 12 12 14 
Netherlands 24 (38) 22 (35) 21 (35) 11 11 10 
Portugal 27 (37) 27 (38) 24 (40) 23 21 18 
Spain 27 (41) 22 (37) 24 (39) 19 18 20 
Sweden      28 (42)   11 
United Kingdom 32 (41) 29 (41) 30 (42) 20 19 19 
EU15 26 (40) 23 (40) 26 (42) 17 15 17 
 
Note: Poverty threshold is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income (after social 
transfers). Figures between brackets represent poverty rates where pensions are excluded from income before 
transfers and taxes. In all cases, the risk-of-poverty threshold (before and after social transfers and taxes) is 
set at 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income.  
 
Source:  Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009) and own calculations 
 
 
We calculate an absolute measure of poverty reduction - the absolute antipoverty effect is the 
percentage point difference between the poverty rate before and after taxes and transfers. A 
comparison of the number of people on low incomes before social benefits other than pensions and 
those on low incomes after social benefits illustrates one of the main purposes of such benefits: 
their redistributive effect and, in particular, their ability to alleviate the risk of poverty and reduce 
the percentage of population (having to manage) with a low income. In 2007, the average at-risk-
of-poverty rate in EU15 countries was 26 percent before social transfers other than pensions and 
17 percent when calculated after all social transfers and taxes. So, social transfers were successful 
in lifting 35 percent of persons with low income above the poverty line. Social benefits other than 
pensions reduce the percentage of people at risk of poverty in all the countries, but to very 
disparate degrees. The reduction is smallest (less than 25 percent) in some Mediterranean States 
(Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal). The reduction is greatest in Sweden (61 percent); Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Austria and France also record reductions due to social transfers of 50 
                                                 
16  This result should be interpreted with caution, because there is a disruption in the time series of poverty 
indicators presented in Table 1. Until 2001, data were provided by the European Community Household 
Panel survey (ECHP). Since 2005 all EU-15 countries provide data from the new European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). During the transitional period poverty indicators were provided 
by national sources which were harmonized ex-post as closely as possible with EU-SILC definitions by 
Eurostat. Despite the fact that most EU-SILC variables are defined in the same way as the corresponding 
ECHP variables, some differences arise. See for more details ‘The continuity of indicators during the 
transition between ECHP and EU-SILC’ from Eurostat (2005).  
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percent or more. In the absence of social benefits other than pensions, in 2007 in two member 
states (Ireland and the United Kingdom) 30 percent or more of the population would have been at-
risk-of-poverty. 
Figure 1 illustrates these pronounced differences in the performance of the social protection 
systems of the EU15 countries in reducing poverty for 2007. The antipoverty effect of social 
transfers (other than pensions) and taxes amounts 9 percentage points for EU15. Figure 1 points at 
some ‘best-practices’ for the EU15 countries in combating poverty. Countries are listed is 
descending order of the magnitude of their poverty rates after social transfers and taxes. The 
Netherlands have the lowest poverty rate in the EU15 (10 percent); Greece, Italy and Spain have 
the highest poverty score (20 percent of entire population). In panel (a) retirement and survivor's 
pensions are counted as income before transfers; in panel (b) pensions are excluded from. In the 
latter case the antipoverty effect of social transfers (and taxes) is much higher. However, Spain 
still produces a relatively low antipoverty effect. In this case the best-practices for 2007 is found in 
France.  
 
Figure 1: Antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes, EU15, total population, 2007 
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Panel (a) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
Panel (b) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009); own calculations 
 
 
Next, we also include eleven non-EU15 countries as a benchmark into our analysis. We calculated 
the antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes based on up-dated figures from the OECD 
(2008, p. 141) for 25 countries. This dataset measures the difference between poverty rates based 
on disposable incomes and those based on market income. A 50 percent threshold is applied for 
the poverty line instead of the 60 percent of the official EU-indicator.17 In general antipoverty 
effects of social transfers and taxes are somewhat higher for most EU15 countries compared to 
outcomes of the official EU-statistics used in the previous analysis (Figure 1), although results are 
hardly comparable.18  
In all OECD countries, public cash benefits and taxes significantly reduce poverty. Table 2 
highlights differences across countries in the role of government taxes and cash benefits in 
reducing poverty. As reported by OECD (2008, p. 291-292), most of the redistribution towards 
people at the bottom of the income scale is generally achieved through public cash benefits – with 
the main exception of the Unites States, where a large part of the support provided to low-income 
families is administered through the income tax system (EITC). These cross-country differences in 
the scale of redistribution partly reflect differences in the size and structure of social spending. 
OECD countries redistribute in a variety of ways – some through universal benefits, others with 
more targeted programs, some mainly relying on transfers, others mainly granting tax rebates to 
low-income families.  
                                                 
17  For this analysis we prefer using OECD-data rather than LIS-data. LIS also presents poverty rates for 
market income and for disposable income (based on the work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006)); however, the 
LIS Fiscal Redistribution Dataset covers only 13 countries between 1979-2002. 
18  Among other factors, depending on the density of low income population between 50 and 60 percent of 
median income in the countries, which varies by country.  
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Table 2: OECD poverty scores of market income and disposable income, around 2005 
 
  
Poverty rate 
market income 
(PL50) 
Poverty rate 
disposable income 
(PL50) 
Effect of social 
transfers and taxes 
 
EU15      
Austria 23 7 16 
Belgium 33 9 24 
Denmark 24 5 18 
Finland 18 7 10 
France 31 7 24 
Germany 34 11 23 
Ireland 31 15 16 
Italy 34 11 22 
Luxembourg 29 8 21 
Netherlands 25 8 17 
Portugal 29 13 16 
Sweden 27 5 21 
United Kingdom 26 8 18 
 
Non-EU15      
Australia 29 12 16 
Canada 23 12 11 
Czech Republic 28 6 22 
Iceland 20 7 13 
Japan 27 15 12 
Korea 18 15 3 
New Zealand 27 11 16 
Norway 24 7 17 
Poland 38 15 23 
Slovakia 27 8 19 
United States 26 17 9 
Mean OECD-25 27.0 10.0 17.0 
Mean EU15 27.8 8.8 19.0 
Mean non-EU15 26.0 11.3 14.7 
 
Source: OECD (2009, p. 139-141), and own calculations 
 
 
EU15 countries show an antipoverty effect of 19.0 percentage points on average, while non-EU15-
countries produce on average a lower antipoverty effect of 14.7 percentage points among their 
population. Best-practices at the top of this list are found for Belgium, France, Poland, Germany, 
Italy and the Czech Republic. On the bottom of this country ranking we find Korea and the United 
States with antipoverty effects of less than 10 percentage points. Remarkably, the United States 
relative poverty rate before taxes and social transfers is actually below average for the selected 
countries (and below EU15-average), even though the United States ranks the highest of all the 
countries in this comparison group in relative poverty rates after taxes and transfers. Given this 
divergence, it should be no surprise that of the countries listed, the United States (and Japan) 
devotes the smallest share of its resources to public antipoverty income transfer programs (cf. 
Smeeding, 2005).19 However, when private social expenditures are also taken into account, this 
picture alters. In that case, the United States rank fifth when all 25 countries are ordered on basis 
of their level of total social expenditures. So, public versus private social expenditures may have 
opposite antipoverty effects (cf. Caminada and Goudswaard, 2010). Moreover, these large cross-
country differences in the antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes call upon for further 
explanation.  
                                                 
19 Scholz et al (2008, p. 30) question why U.S. anti-poverty spending has been low and relatively stable last 
decades given its persistent and high poverty rates by international standards. 
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4.2 The impact of welfare state effort in the EU15 around 2005-2007  
Next we turn to the reduction of poverty rates through social transfers and taxes and its 
relationship to welfare state effort. Table 3 presents the linkage between poverty reduction and 
social expenditure ratios for EU15 countries. This gives a picture of the targeting of social 
protection efforts across EU15 countries at one moment in time (around 2005-2007). Absolute 
antipoverty effects are divided by net social spending ratios to see which country targets best per 
one point of GDP spent on social expenditure. This way we provide for an indicator on Public Policy 
Effectiveness on Poverty Alleviation across countries. 
Our analysis highlights some cross-country differences of poverty alleviation in the EU15, although 
the ranking must be interpreted with caution due to cyclical factors. When we rank countries 
according to their ‘effectiveness’ of combating poverty (column 7), each percentage point of net 
social expenditure alleviates poverty in Ireland and the Scandinavian countries by .7-.9 percentage 
points, while the lowest scores are found in Italy and Spain (.2). Relative to their level of net social 
expenditure, Sweden (24.8 percent of GDP) was expected to have a good performance in 
alleviating poverty. In contrast, France and Germany realize less reduction in poverty rates, but on 
a markedly higher level of net social expenditure (respectively 29 and 27 percent of GDP).  
This result of country ranking is open to debate, mainly because pensions could also be counted as 
social transfers. In that case our country ranking alters somewhat: best-practices are found in 
Finland and Ireland, while the United Kingdom is found at the bottom of the list. See Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Targeting effect of net social expenditure on poverty reduction EU15, around 2005-2007 
 
 
Poverty rate total population 
(PL 60) before and after social 
transfers and taxes, 2007 
Effect of social 
transfers and taxes 
Targeting effect 
  
Before 
pensions 
excluded a 
Before 
pensions 
included b 
After (1)-(3) (2)–(3) 
Net total 
social 
expenditure, 
% GDP, 2005 
 
(4):(6) 
 
(5):(6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Austria 25 43 12 13 31 23.5 0.55 1.32 
Belgium 28 42 15 13 27 26.8 0.49 1.01 
Denmark 27 37 12 15 25 21.6 0.70 1.16 
Finland 29 41 13 16 28 19.5 0.82 1.43 
France 26 46 13 13 33 29.0 0.45 1.14 
Germany 25 43 15 10 28 27.0 0.37 1.04 
Greece 24 42 20 4 22 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
Ireland 33 40 18 15 22 16.1 0.93 1.37 
Italy 24 43 20 4 23 23.1 0.17 1.00 
Luxembourg 23 39 14 9 25 20.3 0.44 1.23 
Netherlands 21 35 10 11 25 23.3 0.47 1.08 
Portugal 24 40 18 6 22 21.4 0.28 1.03 
Spain 24 39 20 4 19 19.1 0.21 1.00 
Sweden 28 42 11 17 31 24.8 0.68 1.25 
United Kingdom 30 42 19 11 23 25.9 0.42 0.89 
Mean EU15 26 42 17 9 25 23.0 0.39 1.09 
 
- (a) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
- (b) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers 
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
Within the group of EU15 countries, we do not find a significant relationship between (high) levels 
of net social expenditure in 2005 and (high) antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes in 
2007; see Figure 2 (panel a). Evidently, social spending is not the only determinant of a country’s 
poverty outcome. However, when pensions are treated as transfers - instead of as primary income 
- the antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes is enormous. As a result the relationship 
between (high) levels of net social expenditure and (high) antipoverty effects of social transfers 
and taxes becomes significant (R2=.38; ρ<.01); see Figure 2 (panel b) and the Appendix for 
details. In this case social spending seems to be an important determinant of a country’s poverty 
outcome, especially among the elderly; see section 5.2. 
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Figure 2: Linkage between net social expenditure and relative poverty rate reduction among EU15-
countries, around 2005-2007  
 
Panel (a) Pension treated as primary income Panel (b) Pension treated as transfers 
y = 0.10x + 8.84
R2 = 0.01
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30
Social expenditure
P
o
v
e
rt
y
 r
a
te
 r
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 
y = 0.70x + 9.88
R2 = 0.38
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30
Social expenditure
P
o
v
e
rt
y
 r
a
te
 r
e
d
u
ct
io
n
 
 
Source:  Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
4.3 The impact of welfare state effort in EU15 over time  
Especially the high figures of ‘effectiveness’ of combating poverty for Ireland in 2007 seem to be 
influenced by the recent economic performance in this particular country (high economic growth, 
low unemployment rates, and (therefore) the lowest level of social expenditures). For this reason 
we employed a sensitivity analysis for the year 1995. Due to lack of data on net social spending 
over time, we use gross social spending as expenditure variable, however, we take private 
arrangement into account. Again absolute antipoverty effects are divided by social spending ratios 
to see which country targets best per one point of GDP spent on social expenditure around 1995 
and around 2005-2007. See Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Targeting effect of gross total social expenditure on poverty reduction in the EU15, around 
1995 and around 2005-2007 
 
 Around 1995 Around 2005-2007 Change over time 
  
Pensions 
excluded a 
Pensions 
included b 
Pensions 
excluded a 
Pensions 
included b 
Pensions 
excluded a 
Pensions 
included b 
Austria 0.38 0.98 0.45 1.07 0.07 0.09 
Belgium 0.39 0.92 0.42 0.87 0.03 -0.05 
Denmark  n.a. n.a.  0.51 0.85 n.a. n.a. 
Finland  n.a. n.a. 0.59 1.03 n.a. n.a. 
France 0.36 0.88 0.40 1.03 0.04 0.15 
Germany 0.24 0.78 0.34 0.94 0.10 0.16 
Greece 0.05 0.83 0.18 0.99 0.13 0.16 
Ireland 0.86 1.32 0.83 1.22 -0.03 -0.10 
Italy 0.13 0.83 0.15 0.85 0.02 0.02 
Luxembourg 0.63 1.35 0.37 1.03 -0.26 -0.32 
Netherlands 0.42 0.88 0.38 0.86 -0.04 -0.02 
Portugal 0.22 0.77 0.26 0.94 0.04 0.17 
Spain 0.37 1.01 0.18 0.88 -0.19 -0.13 
Sweden  n.a. n.a.  0.53 0.96 n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 0.45 0.78 0.39 0.81 -0.06 0.03 
Mean EU12 0.36 0.94 0.35 0.96 -0.01 0.02 
 
- (a) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
- (b) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers 
- EU12: excluding Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
On average, the targeting effect of social spending did not change much during the period 1995-
2007. Our indicator of Public Policy Effectiveness on Poverty Alleviation improved in seven 
countries and declined in five EU15 countries. Especially Luxembourg and Spain show notable lower 
figures for around 2005-2007, while Greece improved their performance relatively well. When 
pensions are considered as primary income, Ireland ranks on top, both in 1995 and around 2005-
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2007. Also the bottom of our country ranking seems rather stable over time (Italy and Greece). So, 
as far as the targeting effect of welfare state effort within EU15 concerned, both top and bottom 
positions of our ranking are rather steady over the business cycle. Note, however, that country 
ranking depends on how pensions are treated. Moreover, Denmark, Finland and Sweden were not 
taken into account due to lack of time-series data for these countries. 
 
4.4 Benchmarking with non-EU15 countries  
As a benchmark we also include eleven non-EU15 countries in our analysis. Our picture of the 
targeting of social transfers and taxes on poverty reduction is based upon OECD data (2008, p. 
141) applying a 50 percent threshold for poverty. We distinguish between EU15 and non-EU15 
countries, and rank countries according to their ‘effectiveness’ of combating poverty. However, 
cross-national comparison of total social spending is rather sensitive with respect to expenditures 
related to health care programs, especially when EU15 countries and non-EU15 countries are 
compared. For example, among all countries the United States spent most on health programs (49 
percent of public and private social expenditure), while figures for EU15 are much lower (27 
percent on average). One could argue either way: health expenditures generally do not qualify as 
income transfers; at the same time health programs are an important element of the safety net in 
most countries, probably generating large antipoverty effects through benefits in kinds and taxes 
(contributions). We undertake a pragmatic approach, because including or neglecting health 
expenditure will affect our indicator of Public Policy Effectiveness on Poverty Alleviation across 
countries to a large extent. We employ both total social spending and total social spending 
excluding expenditures for health programs. The latter figures are presented within brackets in 
Table 5.20 To capture health expenditures, we have to use gross rather than net social 
expenditures for this analysis; both public and private social arrangement are taken into account. 
 
Remarkably, each percentage point of total social expenditure alleviates poverty in both EU15 and 
non-EU15 countries on average by .7 percentage points. For EU15 countries we (again) find a top- 
position for Ireland, while surprisingly Finland scores lowest in this ranking. Outside EU15, each 
percentage point of total social expenditure alleviates poverty with 1.1-1.3 percentage points in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, while the lowest scores are found in Korea and the United 
States (.3-.4). Especially the targeting effectiveness of the United States is remarkably low, and 
lies just below half of the average of all countries presented in Table 5. Two factors seem to be of 
importance. First, excluding health expenditures improves the targeting effect of (remaining) social 
spending on poverty reduction of the United States considerably. Obviously, excluding health 
expenditure generates higher targeting results for other countries as well (although to a lesser 
extent), leaving the cross-national ranking of the targeting scores more or less unaltered. The 
lowest scores are still found for Korea and the United States. Secondly, a threshold of 50 percent of 
median income is applied, while US social policy target on lower levels of income to lift people out 
of poverty.  
 
                                                 
20  Following SOCX (2008) “health” comprises all public expenditure on health is included (not total health 
expenditure): current expenditure on health, personal and collective services and investment. Expenditure 
in this category encompasses, among other things, expenditure on in-patient care, ambulatory medical 
services and pharmaceutical goods. (Individual health expenditure, insofar as it is not reimbursed by a 
public institution, is not included; cash benefits related to sickness are recorded under sickness benefits). 
Voluntary private social health expenditure are estimates on the benefits to recipients that derive from 
private health plans which contain an element of redistribution, such private health insurance plan are often 
employment-based and/or tax-advantaged.  
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Table 5: Targeting effect of gross total social expenditure on poverty reduction in 25 countries, 2005 
 
 
Poverty rates (PL 50) 
total population 
before and after 
social transfers and 
taxes 
  Before After 
Effect social 
transfers and 
taxes 
Gross public and 
private social 
expenditure, % GDP 
Targeting effect 
 
EU15        
Ireland 31 15 16 18.0 (10.9) 0.89 (1.48) 
Luxembourg 29 8 21 24.3 (17.1) 0.86 (1.23) 
Italy 34 11 22 27.1 (20.2) 0.83 (1.11) 
Belgium 33 9 24 30.9 (23.1) 0.77 (1.04) 
Germany 34 11 23 29.7 (21.0) 0.76 (1.07) 
France 31 7 24 32.2 (23.0) 0.73 (1.02) 
Sweden 27 5 21 32.2 (25.4) 0.66 (0.84) 
Portugal 29 13 16 25.0 (17.4) 0.65 (0.93) 
United Kingdom 26 8 18 28.4 (20.4) 0.63 (0.88) 
Denmark 24 5 18 29.5 (23.5) 0.62 (0.78) 
Netherlands 25 8 17 29.2 (21.4) 0.58 (0.80) 
Austria 23 7 16 29.1 (21.8) 0.57 (0.75) 
Finland 18 7 10 27.2 (20.8) 0.38 (0.49) 
 
Non-EU15        
Czech Republic 28 6 22 19.8 (13.5) 1.13 (1.65) 
Slovak Republic 27 8 19 17.6 (12.3) 1.09 (1.56) 
Poland 38 15 23 21.0 (16.7) 1.09 (1.37) 
New Zealand 27 11 16 18.9 (11.6) 0.84 (1.36) 
Australia 29 12 16 20.8 (14.3) 0.78 (1.14) 
Norway 24 7 17 23.7 (17.9) 0.73 (0.96) 
Iceland 20 7 13 21.8 (15.5) 0.59 (0.83) 
Japan 27 15 12 22.4 (15.9) 0.53 (0.75) 
Canada 23 12 11 22.0 (14.0) 0.50 (0.79) 
United States 26 17 9 26.0 (13.2) 0.35 (0.69) 
Korea 18 15 3 9.3 (5.9) 0.31 (0.49) 
Mean OECD-25 26.6 9.9 16.7 24.4 (17.4) 0.70 (0.98) 
Mean EU15 27.8 8.8 19.0 27.9 (20.5) 0.68 (0.93) 
Mean non-EU15 25.3 11.1 14.3 20.3 (13.7) 0.72 (1.07) 
 
Note: Figure between brackets exclude social expenditure for health programs. 
 
Source: OECD (2008, p. 141), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
Within the group of EU15 countries we do not find a significant relationship between (high) levels 
of gross public and private social expenditure and (high) antipoverty effects of social transfers and 
taxes across countries (R2=.28; ρ>.06), in line with our analysis of section 4.2. Also for non-EU15 
countries such a relationship cannot be found. Moreover, we did several correlation tests with 
slightly other specifications for the social expenditure variable (including and excluding health 
programs; gross or net of taxes), but it is hard to find a significant relationship between levels of 
social spending and antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes in 2005. The Appendix 
presents details. 
 
One could argue that the results presented so far could also be sensitive to the data year chosen 
(around 2005). Therefore, we performed a sensitivity analysis for those countries where data 
around 1995 and 2005 are available. Table 6 show the targeting effect of one percentage point of 
GDP spent on social expenditure around 1995 and around 2005 in a comparative setting. Country 
rankings based on our indicator for Public Policy Effectiveness on Poverty Alleviation for 1995 and 
for 2005 are presented between brackets.  
Note that the effect of social transfers and taxes in reducing poverty did not change (that much) on 
average across countries last decade. Targeting declined modestly in EU15 countries (in line with 
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Table 4), and increased somewhat in non-EU15 countries. Relatively large drops are found for 
Belgium, New Zealand and Finland, while Japan, Italy and Germany increased effectiveness since 
1995. The ranking of countries according to their targeting effect appears to be rather stable over 
time. Nevertheless Italy, Germany, Japan and Portugal rank notable higher in 2005 (upwards 3 
positions), while Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom are positioned 3 or 4 ranks lower in our 
table of effectiveness in combating poverty with transfers/tax systems. 
 
Table 6: Targeting effect of gross total social expenditure on poverty reduction, around 1995 and 
2005 
 
 
Poverty reduction 
social transfers 
and taxes 
Gross public and 
private social 
expenditure 
Targeting effect 
 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 (rank) 2005 (rank) Change 
Australia 17 16 21.1 20.8 0.80 (4) 0.78 (4) -0.02  
Belgium 26 24 28.4 30.9 0.91 (3) 0.77 (5) -0.14  
Canada 14 11 23.3 22.0 0.59 (12) 0.50 (14) -0.09  
Czech Republic 21 22 18.3 19.8 1.14 (1) 1.13 (1) -0.01  
Denmark 20 18 31.3 29.5 0.65 (10) 0.62 (11) -0.03  
Finland 16 10 32.2 27.2 0.49 (14) 0.38 (15) -0.11  
Germany 20 23 29.6 29.8 0.68 (9) 0.76 (6) 0.07  
Italy 17 22 24.0 27.1 0.70 (8) 0.83 (3) 0.13  
Japan 5 12 14.8 22.4 0.36 (16) 0.53 (13) 0.18  
Netherlands 18 17 30.6 29.2 0.58 (13) 0.58 (12) 0.00  
New Zealand 19 16 19.4 18.9 0.96 (2) 0.84 (2) -0.13  
Norway 17 17 25.0 23.7 0.70 (7) 0.73 (7) 0.03  
Portugal 12 16 18.1 23.5 0.64 (11) 0.69 (8) 0.05  
Sweden 26 21 34.6 32.2 0.75 (5) 0.66 (9) -0.08  
United Kingdom 19 18 26.9 28.4 0.71 (6) 0.63 (10) -0.07  
United States 10 9 23.7 26.1 0.41 (15) 0.35 (16) -0.06  
Mean OECD-16 17.2 17.1 25.1 25.7 0.69   0.67   -0.02  
Mean EU15 19.2 17.9 28.4 28.6 0.68   0.62   -0.05  
Mean non-EU15 14.6 16.7 20.8 22.0 0.70   0.76   0.06  
 
Source: OECD (2008, p. 141-142), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
The main message is that we find modest evidence for less targeting of social transfers and taxes 
in EU15 countries over time. For the 16 countries reported in Table 6, we find a significant 
relationship between levels of social expenditure and antipoverty effects of social transfers and 
taxes across countries for the year 1995 (R2=.38; p<.02), but the social expenditure variable 
becomes insignificant for 2005 (R2=.14; p>0.15). The effectives of (high) social spending on (high) 
antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes faded away during last decade. Less targeting 
partly offers an explanation for higher poverty rates today than in 1995. Obviously, more factors 
should be taken into consideration (see Kim, 2000a; and Behrendt, 2002, OECD, 2008). Market 
income inequality is obviously an important source of cross-national variation in poverty. Also 
specific differences in both the social and the tax system should be taken into account in the 
assessment of the antipoverty effect of welfare states. Moreover, international variations in poverty 
profiles are driven by variations in socio-demographic and socio-economic structures, as these 
factors put different restraints on income transfer schemes. And also, besides social transfers, 
several other policy instruments may be used to alleviate poverty. For example, several countries 
put relatively much emphasis on improving job opportunities and stimulating labor force 
participation of lower income groups. 
 
It should be noted that this paper focus on the antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes. 
Obviously, changes of the antipoverty effect over time are the result of many factors. OECD (2008, 
p. 144-146) disentangled the total change over time in three components: the part due to changes 
in market-income poverty (keeping constant both the structure of the population and the effect of 
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taxes and transfers in reducing poverty), the part due to changes in the effect of taxes and 
transfers in reducing market-income poverty (for a given population structure and market-rate 
poverty), and the part due to changes in the structure of the population (for a given market-
income poverty rate and level of effectiveness of tax and transfers in reducing poverty). The OECD-
study concludes that for most countries the largest part of changes in poverty rates for the period 
1995-2005 can be attributed to net public transfers to households at the bottom of the income 
scale. Changes in the structure of the population dampened the rise of poverty rates in most 
countries, while the partial effect of changes in market-income poverty show much variation across 
countries during this period. 
Overall, the trends of the components of post-tax-transfer poverty can be summarized as follows. 
In most of welfare states, pre-tax-transfer poverty has increased during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Most countries have increased the size of the welfare state during the same period. 
However, in many cases, the increase in the size of the welfare state is not large enough to offset 
the increase in pre-tax-transfer poverty. As a result, post-tax-transfer poverty has also - more or 
less - increased in these countries (cf. Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; Kim, 2000a; Smeeding, 
2005). Changes in government redistribution dampened the rise in poverty in the decade from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, but reinforced it in the following one (cf. OECD, 2008, p. 148).  
Minimum income policies do not lift people out of poverty nowadays. To illustrate this: Table 7 
compares the generosity of net social assistance benefits for two family types among EU15 Member 
States. Compared to the official EU poverty line only Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands provide benefits adequate minimum income support. In four other countries (Austria, 
Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom) benefits are close to being adequate, falling short 
about 10 percent of this poverty line. In all other countries benefits however drop more than 10 
percent (Belgium, France, Luxembourg) and some times even more than 40 percent of the poverty 
line (Spain and Portugal). 
 
Table 7: Adequacy of net social assistance in % of poverty line, 2004 
 
 Single person Lone parent 
Austria 85 90 
Belgium 76 89 
Denmark 126 131 
Finland 111 108 
France 77 80 
Germany 102 98 
Ireland 121 105 
Luxembourg 72 72 
Netherlands 120 101 
Portugal 48 83 
Spain 55 57 
Sweden 98 87 
United Kingdom 96 105 
Mean EU15 91.3 92.8 
 
Source: Cantillon, Van Mechelen, and Schulte (2008, p. 15) 
 
 
5. SOCIAL POLICY AREAS 
 
5.1 Vulnerable groups: Decomposition of poverty by age groups 
An important critique on aggregated social expenditure data is that it is not possible to see which 
individual program is responsible for a specific dynamic. Therefore we show social expenditures for 
various programs. We look at two vulnerable age groups: children and the elderly. We present 
linkages of their poverty rates with social expenditures for social programs such as family and child 
benefits, and the public and private old age pensions and survivor schemes. Such social programs 
are supposed to guarantee a minimum income for those age groups typically over-represented 
among the poor. We are particularly interested in how the social transfers affect their poverty 
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status. For each of the vulnerable groups, we report their poverty rates and then assess the impact 
of transfers and taxes on their poverty rates.  
Figure 3 shows poverty profiles for children and elderly based on LIS and Eurostat. In order to 
account for different intensities of poverty, three different poverty lines are applied. Children and 
elderly are deemed to live in ‘extreme poverty’ households if their income remains below a poverty 
line of 40 percent of median equivalent income; a poverty line of 50 percent demarcates ‘severe 
poverty’, whereas households with an income between 40 and 50 percent of median equivalent 
income are considered as living in ‘moderate poverty’. Households whose income exceeds the 
poverty line of 50 percent, but remains below 60 percent of median equivalent income are 
considered as living ‘in poverty’. Countries are ranked according to their poverty rate at the 60 
percent level of LIS in Figure 3; the shading of the bars shows different intensities of poverty or 
low income. Note that poverty indices from different sources vary and alter the country-ranking to 
some extent.21 Poverty data of LIS and Eurostat are pretty well correlated for children (around .9), 
while poverty data for the elderly show more variation (correlation coefficients range from .66 to 
.80, depending on the poverty threshold applied).  
On average, across all countries displayed, around 18 percent of all children fell below the 60 
percent poverty threshold. Child poverty rates are especially low in the Nordic countries, where 
fewer than 10 percent of all children are poor. Child poverty is high in Mexico and the United States 
(around 30 percent), but also in Italy, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom, where it is above 20 
percent. In most countries, relative poverty rates among children are also higher than for the 
entire population, but with much variation across countries. For example, in most Scandinavian 
countries poverty among children is even lower than that of total population, suggesting that 
families with children are relatively well protected against poverty (cf. Lelkes and Zólyomi, 2008, p. 
5). These differences suggest that specific factors increase or decrease risks of poverty for children 
in OECD countries (cf. Förster and Mira d'Ercole, 2005).  
 
                                                 
21 The differences in methodology are minor. The concept of disposable income is quasi-identical between the 
three data sources (OECD, 2008, p. 153). The equivalence scale used by Eurostat differs only slightly from 
that used by the OECD and LIS, giving a somewhat higher weight to additional household members and 
distinguishing between adults and children. Eurostat uses the so-called “modified OECD” equivalence scale. 
This scale gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to any other household member aged 14 and over and 
0.3 to each child. The resulting figure is attributed to each member of the household, whether adult or 
children. The equivalent size of a household that consists of 2 adults and 2 children below the age of 14 is 
therefore: 1.0 + 0.5 + (2*0.3) = 2.1. Source: Eurostat (2005, p.63). 
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Figure 3: Poverty rates children and elderly 
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Child poverty Eurostat 2007 
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Poverty rates elderly LIS around 2001 
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Poverty rates elderly Eurostat 2007 
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Note: Poverty rates are measured as the proportion of individuals with equivalized disposable income less than 
40, 50 and 60 percent of the median income of the entire population.  
 
Source: LIS (2009), and Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009) 
 
 
Traditionally, also the elderly are seen as a vulnerable group, because their economic wellbeing 
largely depends on the social protection system. Data from LIS and from Eurostat do no tell the 
same story for the elderly when a poverty line of 60 percent is applied; much higher statistics for 
LIS-data. For example, LIS data presents a mean of 26.6 for EU15 countries, while Eurostat 
reports only 19.5 percent. Especially, Ireland is a special case: LIS reports that 55 percent of 
Irelands’ elderly live at risk of poverty, while Eurostats’ figure is hardly 29 percent. 
Across all LIS-countries, poverty among elderly is on average 60 percent higher compared to total 
population. Cross-country differences are large, with relatively good figures for Poland, 
Luxembourg, Hungary and the Netherlands. In several countries poverty exceeds 1/3 of the elderly 
- in Spain, the United States, Mexico, Belgium, Greece, Australia, Ireland and Slovakia. 
To sum up, our analysis of poverty of vulnerable age-groups identifies serious holes in the safety 
net of several countries. In some member states the safety net offers little assistance to vulnerable 
groups (cf. Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002). On average, child poverty is a lesser problem than is 
the poverty of elderly in these nations. But single parents and their children generally have the 
highest poverty rates, while those in two-parent units, mixed units, and the childless experience 
the least poverty.  
 
5.2 Children 
In Finland and Denmark child poverty rate is around 10 percent (official EU-indictor), while over 20 
percent of all children lives in poverty in Portugal, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Italy. We 
calculate the absolute measures of poverty reduction through social transfers and taxes; see Figure 
4, panel (a). The best-practices in 2007 are found in Austria, Sweden, Ireland and Finland with 
antipoverty effects over 20 percent points. Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy produce rather poor 
antipoverty effects for children with their tax/transfer system (below 10 percent points). The 
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picture in panel (b) is similar, although we find little higher antipoverty effects for all countries 
when retirement and survivor's pensions are considered as transfers. 
 
Figure 4: Antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes 0-15 years among EU15, 2007 
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Panel (b) 
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Notes: 
- Panel (a) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers 
- Panel (b) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
 
Source:  Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
The OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) includes internationally comparable statistics on 
gross public and private social expenditure at program level. SOCX registers also family programs, 
i.e. expenditure which supports families (excluding one-person households). This expenditure is 
often related to the costs associated with raising children or with the support of other dependants. 
Table 8 presents the linkage between poverty reduction through the tax/transfer system, and 
social expenditure for family programs for EU15 countries. This gives a picture of the targeting 
effectiveness of combating child poverty across European countries. However, the earlier disclaimer 
applies: the ranking of the countries can be influenced by country specific cyclical factors due the 
data year 2005-2007 chosen (relatively low/high social expenditures). 
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Table 8: Targeting effect of social expenditures for family programs on poverty reduction of 
children in EU15, around 2005-2007 
 
 
Poverty rate 0-15 years (PL 
60) before and after social 
transfers and taxes, 2007 
Effect of social 
transfers and taxes 
Targeting effect 
  
Before 
pensions 
excluded a 
Before 
pensions 
included b 
After (1)-(3) (2)–(3) 
Gross social 
expenditure 
on family 
programs, % 
GDP, 2005 
 
(4):(6) 
 
(5):(6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Austria 38 40 15 23 25 2.8 8.2 8.9 
Belgium 31 32 17 14 15 2.6 5.4 5.8 
Denmark 24 24 9 15 15 3.2 4.7 4.7 
Finland 32 32 10 22 22 3.0 7.3 7.3 
France 36 37 15 21 22 3.0 7.0 7.3 
Germany 31 31 14 17 17 2.3 7.4 7.4 
Greece 27 29 23 4 6 1.1 3.6 5.5 
Ireland 40 41 19 21 22 2.5 8.4 8.8 
Italy 32 34 25 7 9 1.4 5.0 6.4 
Luxembourg 33 35 20 13 15 3.6 3.6 4.2 
Netherlands 25 25 14 11 11 1.6 6.9 6.9 
Portugal 27 30 21 6 9 1.2 5.0 7.5 
Spain 28 30 23 5 7 1.1 4.5 6.4 
Sweden 34 34 11 23 23 3.2 7.2 7.2 
United Kingdom 41 42 23 18 19 3.2 5.6 5.9 
Mean EU15 33 34 19 14 15 2.4 5.9 6.3 
 
- (a) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers 
- (b) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
Rather good targeting figures of child poverty alleviation per point of GDP social spending on family 
programs are found in Ireland, followed by Austria, Germany, Finland and Sweden. Low scores for 
Luxembourg, Greece, Spain and Denmark. In these countries each percentage point GDP spent for 
family programs alleviates poverty only by 3.6-4.7 percentage points around 2005-2007.  
Within the group of EU15 countries we do find a significant relationship between (high) levels of 
gross total social expenditure on family programs in 2005 and (high) antipoverty effects of social 
transfers and taxes for children in 2007 (R2=0.63; ρ<.01). Obviously this result does not depend 
on the way pensions are treated (as primary income or as transfers). See Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Linkage between gross total social expenditure on family programs and relative poverty 
rate reduction among children in EU15-countries, around 2005-2007  
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Source:  Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
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Data for 1995 tell more or less the same story: a strong positive linkage between levels of social 
expenditure for family programs and antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes for children. 
This relationship became even somewhat stronger during the past decade (higher correlation 
coefficients and lower ρ-values) probably under the influence of targeting family programs further 
towards those children in need. See the Appendix for details. 
 
Next, we also include ten non-EU15 countries into our analysis. Poverty rates are from LIS (around 
2001), and a 60-percent-of-median-income poverty threshold is applied. For all countries, we find 
a significant negative relationship between levels of social expenditure on family programs and 
poverty rates (R2=.32; ρ<.01). This correlation is much stronger for non-EU15 countries (R2=.50) 
compared with the EU15 countries (R2=.12). See Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Linkage between gross total social expenditure on family programs and LIS poverty rates 
among 24 countries, around 2001-2005  
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Non-EU15 countries: Australia, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, 
Switzerland and the United States 
EU15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Source:  LIS (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
This result across countries is rather robust over time, and is independent of poverty lines applied 
(40, 50 or 60 percent threshold) or the data source used for child poverty rates (LIS or OECD). Our 
Appendix presents the linkage between poverty rates for children and social expenditure for family 
programs for all countries where all relevant data items are available around 1985, 1995 and 2005. 
For all data years, we find a strong negative relationship, however, this relationship much stronger 
for non-EU15 countries compared to EU15 countries. 
 
5.2 Elderly 
In most EU15 countries, relative poverty rates among elderly are much higher than for the entire 
population or for children, but with much variation across countries. In Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands poverty among the elderly is below 10 percent (official EU-indictor), while over a 
quarter of all elderly lives in poverty in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and in the United Kingdom. These 
differences suggest that specific factors increase risks of poverty for elderly in some EU-countries. 
We calculate the absolute measures of poverty reduction through social transfers and taxes. It 
should be stressed that the effectiveness of combating poverty among the elderly across countries 
is highly sensitive for the way pensions are treated. Given their weight in the disposable income of 
elderly people, pensions play a major role in shaping income adequacy and poverty risks for this 
group of the population. When pension is considered as primary income, the antipoverty effect of 
transfers and taxes among elderly in EU15 amounts 4 percent points on average. However, in case 
pensions are excluded from social transfers we find much higher figures for the antipoverty effect 
of transfers (and taxes) across EU15 countries: 69 percent points on average! 
Figure 7, panel (a) presents the best-practices for 2007 to be found in Denmark, Ireland and 
Sweden with antipoverty effects above 10 percent points. Germany and Italy produce rather poor 
antipoverty effects for elderly with their tax/transfer system (below 3 percent points). Obviously 
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the picture in panel (b) shows much higher antipoverty effects for all countries when retirement 
and survivor's pensions are excluded from primary income, now presenting antipoverty effects of 
over 80 points for the Netherlands, followed by Sweden, Luxembourg and France.22 
 
Figure 7: Antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes elderly among EU15, 2007 
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Panel (b) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Lu
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
S
w
e
d
e
n
F
ra
n
ce
A
u
st
ri
a
G
e
rm
a
n
y
D
e
n
m
a
rk
F
in
la
n
d
It
a
ly
B
e
lg
iu
m
G
re
e
ce
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
S
p
a
in
Ir
e
la
n
d
U
K
M
e
a
n
 E
U
1
5
Effect of social transfers and taxes
Poverty after social transfers and taxes 
 
Notes: 
- Panel (a) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers 
- Panel (b) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
- In all cases the risk-of-poverty threshold is set at 60 percent of median equivalized disposable income.  
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), and own calculations 
 
 
Again, we use the OECD Social Expenditure Database. SOCX contains gross total social 
expenditures both on public old age programs (pensions) and on survivor schemes.23 Table 9 
presents the linkage between poverty reduction through the tax/transfer system, and social 
expenditure for public and private old age pensions and survivors schemes for EU15 countries. This 
gives a picture of the targeting effectiveness of combating poverty among elderly across European 
countries. However, the earlier disclaimer applies: the ranking of the countries can be influenced 
by country specific cyclical factors due the data year 2005-2007 chosen (relatively low/high social 
expenditures).  
 
                                                 
22  Wu (2005) indicate that without social old age and survivors programs more than half of the older persons 
would be in poverty. His figure is much lower than ours for EU15. Wu’s analyses are based on LIS-data for 
15 selected OECD countries; a 50-percent-of-median-income poverty threshold is applied. Lefèbvre (2007, 
p. 13) shows much higher figures based on LIS-data (PL 50), ranging from 54 percent for Finland to over 
90 percent for Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Spain and Slovenia.   
23  Old-age: comprises all cash expenditures (including lump-sum payments) on old-age pensions. Old-age 
cash benefits provide an income for persons retired from the labor market or guarantee incomes when a 
person has reached a 'standard' pensionable age or fulfilled the necessary contributory requirements. This 
category also includes early retirement pensions: pensions paid before the beneficiary has reached the 
'standard' pensionable age relevant to the program. Excluded are programs concerning early retirement for 
labor market reasons which are classified under unemployment. Old-age includes supplements for 
dependants paid to old-age pensioners with dependants under old-age cash benefits. Old age also includes 
social expenditure on services for the elderly people, services such as day care and rehabilitation services, 
home-help services and other benefits in kind. It also includes expenditure on the provision of residential 
care in an institution (for example, the cost of operating homes for the elderly). 
Survivors: many countries have social expenditure programs in the public sphere which provide the spouse 
or dependent of a deceased person with a benefit (either in cash or in kind). Expenditure in this policy area 
has been grouped under survivors. Allowances and supplements for dependent children of the recipient of a 
survivors‘benefit are also recorded here. 
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Table 9: Targeting effect of social expenditures for old age pension programs and survivors 
schemes on poverty reduction of elderly in EU15, around 2005-2007 
 
 
Poverty rate 65 years and 
over (PL 60) before and after 
social transfers and taxes, 
2007 
Effect of social 
transfers and taxes 
Targeting effect 
  
Before 
pensions 
excluded a 
Before 
pensions 
included b 
After (1)-(3) (2)–(3) 
Gross social 
expenditure 
on OAP + 
survivors 
programs, % 
GDP, 2005 
 
(4):(6) 
 
(5):(6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Austria 17 89 14 3 75 13.5 0.2 5.6 
Belgium 27 91 23 4 68 11.9 0.3 5.7 
Denmark 34 93 18 16 75 9.4 1.7 8.0 
Finland 31 93 22 9 71 9.6 0.9 7.4 
France 18 95 13 5 82 13.0 0.4 6.3 
Germany 18 93 17 1 76 12.3 0.1 6.2 
Greece 28 82 23 5 59 12.0 0.4 4.9 
Ireland 42 86 29 13 57 4.5 2.9 12.7 
Italy 24 84 22 2 62 15.4 0.1 4.0 
Luxembourg 10 89 7 3 82 7.6 0.4 10.8 
Netherlands 17 95 10 7 85 9.3 0.8 9.1 
Portugal 29 85 26 3 59 10.5 0.3 5.6 
Spain 31 84 28 3 56 8.4 0.4 6.7 
Sweden 23 94 11 12 83 12.2 1.0 6.8 
United Kingdom 38 90 30 8 60 11.0 0.7 5.5 
Mean EU15 25 90 21 4 69 10.7 0.4 6.4 
 
- (a) Pensions are excluded from social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers 
- (b) Pensions are included in social transfers in at risk of poverty rates before social transfers  
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
Rather good targeting figures of poverty alleviation per point of GDP social spending on pension 
programs and survivors schemes are found for Ireland, followed by Denmark and Sweden. Low 
scores for Germany, Italy, Austria, Portugal and Belgium. In these countries each percentage point 
GDP spent for pension programs and survivors schemes alleviates poverty only by .1-.3 percentage 
points around 2005-2007.  
Within the group of EU15 countries there is ample evidence for a relationship between (high) levels 
of gross total social expenditure on old age pension programs and survivors schemes in 2005 and 
(high) antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes for elderly in 2007 (ρ>.93), independent of 
the way pensions are treated (as primary income or as transfers). A similar analysis for the year 
1995 points in the same direction: such a relationship does not exist (see the Appendix for details). 
Finally we include ten non-EU15 countries into our analysis. Poverty rates among the elderly are 
taken from LIS (around 2001), and a 60-percent-of-median-income poverty threshold is applied. 
We do not find a (negative) relationship between levels of social expenditure on old age pension 
and survivors schemes and the level of poverty rates across the 24 developed countries (R2=.13). 
This weak correlation is found for both the group of EU15 countries (R2=.18) and the group of non-
EU15 countries (R2=.15). Despite relatively high gross public and private spending on old-age 
pensions and survivors schemes some countries experience relatively high poverty rates among 
the elderly, especially in Greece. Ireland is a special case in LIS with 55 percent of elderly living at 
risk of poverty in case the 60 percent threshold is applied, probably as a consequence of only 
spending 4.5 percent of GDP for old age pension programs and survivors schemes. Rather good 
figures are found for Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Canada. In these countries relatively low 
poverty rates among the elderly are combined with relatively low gross public and private social 
expenditure on old age and survivors.  
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Figure 8: Linkage between gross social expenditure on old age and survivors programs and LIS 
poverty rates among 24 countries, around 2001-2005  
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Non-EU15 countries: Australia, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Norway, Poland, 
Switzerland and the United States 
EU15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Source:  LIS (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
Also, this result across countries is rather robust over time and is independent of different poverty 
lines applied or the data source used for poverty rates. Our Appendix presents the linkage between 
poverty rates for elderly 65 years and over and social expenditure for pension programs and 
survivors schemes for all countries where all relevant data items are available around 1985, 1995 
and 2005. For all data years we do not find any significant relationship, independent of the 
countries included - EU15 countries and non-EU15 countries - in the sample. See the Appendix for 
details. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of the EU. A wide variety of poverty rates are be found 
within Europe. Some countries are more effective in poverty reduction than other countries. 
Remarkably, average at-risk-of-poverty rates – an official EU social cohesion indicator – have risen 
since the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda. This suggests that recent EU-initiatives regarding 
combating poverty are not very effective yet. Obviously, several policy strategies may be chosen to 
combat poverty. This paper analyzes the effect of social transfer policies on poverty alleviation.  
We analyzed the reduction of poverty rates through taxes and transfers (the difference between 
poverty rates calculated for market incomes and poverty rates calculated for disposable incomes) 
and its relationship to welfare state efforts. Within the group of EU15 countries, we do not find a 
significant relationship between (high) levels of social expenditure and (high) antipoverty effects of 
social transfers and taxes in case pension is earmarked as primary income. This picture alters 
severely when pensions are treated as transfers. In that case the relationship between social 
expenditures and antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes across countries becomes 
significant. So, social spending seems to be an important determinant of a country’s poverty 
outcome, especially among the elderly, when pensions are considered as transfers. 
Our analysis highlights some cross-country differences in targeting of social expenditures on 
poverty alleviation in EU15 and non-EU15 countries around 2005. We provide an indicator of Public 
Policy Effectiveness on Poverty Alleviation across countries. Each percentage point of social 
expenditure alleviates poverty in both EU15 and non-EU15 on average by .7 percentage points. 
Relatively high scores in EU15 countries are found for Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, 
while Italy, Greece and Spain score lowest. Outside Europe the poorest scores are reported for 
Korea and the United States. Remarkably, country ranking is rather stable over time when 
outcomes for 1995 and 2005 are compared, although some of our results may be sensitive to 
cyclical factors. Finally, we analyzed poverty among vulnerable age groups. Our results show that 
family programs and child support alleviate poverty among children to a large extent, especially in 
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non-EU15 countries. For public and private old age pension and survivors schemes we find no 
effect on poverty in case pensions are considered as transfers (both in EU15 and non-EU15 
countries). However, this picture changes completely when pensions are counted as transfers. In 
that case the poverty rate among elderly in EU15 falls from 90 percent to 21 percent through taxes 
and social transfers!  
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APPENDIX: DATA AND CORRELATION TESTS ACROSS COUNTRIES 
 
Structural Indicators EU - Social Cohesion 
- EU-15 and EU-27 
- Data years: 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2007 
- At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers (pensions included in social transfers) at PL 40, PL 50, 
PL 60 and PL 70 
- At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) at PL 40, PL 
50, PL 60 and PL 70 
- At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers at PL 40, PL 50, PL 60 and PL 70 
- Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009) 
- URL: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
- Download: April 13th, 2009 
OECD Poverty Rates 
- OECD-30 and EU-15 
- Data years: 2003, 2004, and 2005 
- Poverty rates at PL 40, at PL 50 and at PL 60 
- Poverty gap at PL 50 
- OECD-26, and EU-15 
- Data years: mid-1980s, mid-1990s, mid-2000’s 
- Poverty rates at PL 50 
- Source: OECD (2008) 
- Download: April 16th, 2009 
LIS Key Figures on Poverty 
- Over 30 countries 
- Data years: between 1979 and 2005 (over 130 LIS surveys conducted in 31 countries between 1979-2005) 
- Poverty rates at PL 40, at PL 50 and at PL 60 
- Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS 2009) 
- URL: http://www.lisproject.org  
- Download: April 16th, 2009 
Gross public and private social expenditure (% GDP) 
- OECD-30 and EU-15 
- Data years: 1985-2005 
- Total 
- Old age 
- Survivors 
- Health 
- Family 
- Other social policy areas 
- Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX 2008) 
- URL: www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure 
- Download: May 14th, 2009  
Gross and net social expenditure (% GDP) 
- OECD-26 and EU-14 
- Data years: 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003 and 2005 
- Source: Adema (2001); Adema and Ladaique (2005); Net Social Expenditure, 2008 edition  
- URL: www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure 
- Download: April 13th, 2009 
 
 
- 30 - 
CORRELATION TESTS ACROSS COUNTRIES  
 
We regress the level of poverty rates across countries with the level of social expenditure as percentage of 
GDP. The coefficient is estimated using a linear ordinary least square regression model of cross-sectional data 
of the following form: 
Yi,t = A + βXi,t + ui   (1) 
The term on the left-hand side of equation (1) is the level of the poverty indicator of country i at time-period t. 
The level of social expenditure as percentage of GDP in country i at period t is given by Xi,t, and ui is a 
disturbance term. If the coefficient β is negative, we say that social expenditures alleviate poverty across 
countries. A is a constant term across countries. The higher the value of β, the stronger will be the antipoverty 
effect of an additional point of GDP spend on social expenditure. The results are presented below.  
 
 
 
 
A1: TARGETING EFFECT OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES ON POVERTY REDUCTION (OECD PL 50), 2005-2007 
 
We present the linkage between the reduction in poverty rates as result of social transfers and taxes, and social 
expenditure for both EU15 and non-EU15 countries. For all countries, we do not find a significant relationship 
between (high) levels of total social expenditure and (high) antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes, 
independent of applying net or gross social indicators. When we exclude health expenditure, the social 
expenditure variable becomes significant. Furthermore, the net social expenditure variable is significant in case 
we only include EU15 countries in our sample. 
 
 Net total social expenditure Gross total social expenditure Idem, excl. health programs 
  Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 
Non-EU15 11.03 0.202 0.018 5.21 0.469 0.114 -0.03 1.074 0.338 
 (1.18) (0.40) -(0.091) (0.58) (1.08) (0.015) (0.00) (2.15) (0.265) 
EU15 1.75 0.742* 0.447 4.60 0.521 0.281 11.84 0.351 0.109 
 (0.30) (2.98) (0.397) (0.66) (2.07) (0.216) (1.88) (1.16) (0.028) 
9.26 0.371 0.097 7.77 0.382 0.159 6.01 0.635** 0.336 All 25  
countries (1.79) (1.53) (0.056) (1.67) (2.04) (0.120) (1.75) (3.33) (0.305) 
 
Notes:  
- OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the .01 level; * significant at .05 level. 
- Correlation coefficient R2; adjusted R2 in parentheses 
-  Selected 25 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Source: OECD (2008), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
 
 
 
A2:  CORRELATION TESTS ON SOCIAL PROGRAMS: LINKAGES BETWEEN POVERTY RATES OF AGE GROUPS 
(LIS PL 60) AND GROSS PUBLIC AND GROSS PRIVATE SOCIAL SPENDING, 2001-2005 
 
 
 
Family programs 
 
 Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes 
   Intercept X1 R2  Intercept X1 R2 
Non-EU15  30.098** -5.624* 0.499  36.812* -1.376 0.147 
  (7.74) (-2.82) (0.437)  (3.30) (-1.10) (0.025) 
EU15  22.121** -2.187 0.117  45.738** -1.784 0.184 
  (4.91) (-1.26) (0.044)  (3.81) (-1.64) (0.115) 
All 24 countries  26.585** -3.870** 0.322  38.788** -1.295 0.127 
  (9.43) (-3.23) (0.291)  (5.11) (-1.75) (0.086) 
 
Notes:  
- OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the .01 level; * significant at .05 level. 
- Correlation coefficient R2; adjusted R2 in parentheses 
- Selected 24 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Source: LIS (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
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A3:  TARGETING EFFECT OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES ON POVERTY REDUCTION (Eurostat PL 60) IN THE EU15, 
OVER TIME 
 
We present the linkage between the reduction in poverty rates as result of social transfers and taxes, and social 
expenditure for EU15 countries, with a breakdown by age groups and social programs targeted to those groups. 
For the social system as a whole, we do not find a significant relationship between (high) levels of social 
expenditure and (high) antipoverty effects of social transfers and taxes between EU15 countries in case old age 
pension is included in market income. However, social expenditure variable(s) become(s) significant when 
pension is counted as transfer income. As a rule of thumb: family programs are pretty well targeted to those 
children in need, while social expenditures for old age pension programs and survivor schemes do not seem to 
alleviate poverty among the elderly in Europe. However, we find pretty good fits when pension is considered as 
a transfer. All results for around 2005-2007 did not alter (that much) the last decade. 
 
 
Linkage between net public and net private social expenditure and EU 
poverty rate reduction total population 
  Intercept X1 (a) R2 Intercept X1 (b) R2 
1995 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
8.838 0.104 0.008 9.880 0.696* 0.381 
EU15 
2005-2007 (1.11) (0.30) (-0.075) (1.66) (2.72) (0.329) 
 
 
Linkage between gross total social expenditure and EU poverty rate 
reduction total population 
  Intercept X1 (a) R2 Intercept X1 (b) R2 
2.702 0.259 0.085 9.061 0.562* 0.375 
1995 
(0.40) (0.97) (-0.006) (1.57) (2.45) (0.313) 
-0.962 0.435 0.166 6.368 0.715** 0.562 
EU15 
2005-2007 (-0.13) (1.61) (0.101) (1.34) (4.09) (0.529) 
 
 
Linkage between gross total social expenditure on family programs and 
EU poverty rate reduction children 
  Intercept X1 (a) R2 Intercept X1 (b) R2 
2.903 5.798** 0.623 14.430 3.465 0.362 
1995 
(1.12) (4.06) (0.585) (5.48)** (2.38)* (0.298) 
-0.161 6.213** 0.641 2.231 5.685** 0.627 
EU15 
2005-2007 (-0.05) (4.82) (0.614) (0.72) (4.68) (0.599) 
 
 
Linkage between gross total social expenditure for old age pension 
programs and survivors schemes and EU poverty rate reduction elderly 
  Intercept X1 (a) R2 Intercept X1 (b) R2 
6.858 -0.112 0.003 36.528 2.753 0.244 
1995 
(1.14) (-0.17) (-0.097) (2.53)* (1.80) (0.169) 
14.277** -0.748 0.202 63.396** 0.617 0.025 
EU15 
2005-2007 (3.14) (-1.82) (0.141) (5.39) (0.58) (-0.050) 
 
Notes:  
- OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the .01 level; * significant at .05 level. 
- Correlation coefficient R2; adjusted R2 in parentheses 
-  (a) pensions are excluded from transfers; (b) pensions are included in transfers 
-  All EU15 countries are included 
 
Source: Eurostat: ECHP/EU-SILC (2009), SOCX (2008), and own calculations 
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A4:  CORRELATION TEST ON SOCIAL PROGRAMS: LINKAGES BETWEEN POVERTY RATES AND GROSS PUBLIC 
AND GROSS PRIVATE SOCIAL SPENDING, OVER TIME 
 
Poverty among children: We present the linkage between poverty rates for children (0-17 years) and social 
expenditure for family programs for all countries where all relevant data items are available. For all data years 
we find a rather strong negative relationship. This correlation is much stronger for non-EU15 countries 
compared to the EU15 countries. This finding does not depend on the database used for poverty rates (OECD or 
LIS), and on the poverty line applied (50 or 60 percent threshold). This finding is rather stable over time. 
 
Panel (a): OECD poverty rates children (PL 50) 
 
 Family programs, around 1985 Family programs, around 1995 Family programs, around 2005 
  Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 
Non-EU15    20.908** -6.493* 0.448 22.081** -4.700** 0.578 
    (6.41) (-2.38) (0.369) (9.75) (-3.88) (0.540) 
EU15    17.497** -4.156** 0.584 20.293** -3.927** 0.468 
    (8.37) (-4.27) (0.552) (6.89) (-3.38) (0.427) 
   18.855** -4.768** 0.565 21.451** -4.374** 0.572 All 28  
countries    (11.43) (-5.35) (0.545) (12.85) (-5.90) (0.556) 
 
Panel (b): LIS poverty rates children (PL 60) 
 
 Family programs, around 1985 Family programs, around 1995 Family programs, around 2005 
  Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 
Non-EU15 30.673** -12.118* 0.724    31.710** -5.900 0.543 
 (7.64) (-3.24) (0.655)    (6.42) (-2.18) (0.429) 
EU15 20.704** -3.842** 0.475    22.121** -2.187 0.117 
 (8.01) (-3.30) (0.431)    (4.91) (-1.26) (0.044) 
23.646** -5.166** 0.543    27.173** -3.978** 0.336 All 20  
countries (10.87) (-4.62) (0.517)    (8.61) (-3.02) (0.299) 
 
 
Poverty among elderly: Next, we present the linkage between poverty rates for elderly (65 years and over) 
and social expenditure for old age pension programs and survivors schemes for all countries where all relevant 
data items are available. There seems to be ample (negative) relationship across all countries. This insignificant 
correlation is found for both the group of non-EU15 countries and the group of EU15 countries. This finding 
does not depend on the database used for poverty rates (OECD or LIS), and on the poverty line applied (50 or 
60 percent threshold). Also this finding is rather stable over time. 
 
Panel (a): OECD poverty rates elderly (PL 50) 
 
 
 
Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes, around 1985 
Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes, around 1995 
Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes, 2005 
  Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 
Non-EU15    28.746** -2.198 0.405 13.546 -0.081 0.001 
    (4.82) (-2.18) (0.320) (1.72) (-0.09) (-0.09) 
EU15    13.649 -0.197 0.004 24.506** -1.121 0.149 
    (1.63) (-0.22) (-0.07) (3.00) (-1.51) (0.084) 
   24.006** -1.325* 0.231 17.260** -0.479 0.031 All 28  
countries    (5.68) (-2.57) (0.196) (3.29) (-0.92) (-0.01) 
 
Panel (b): LIS poverty rates elderly (PL 60) 
 
 Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes, around 1985 
Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes, around 1995 
Old age pension programs and 
survivors schemes, 2005 
  Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 Intercept X1 R2 
Non-EU15 38.313** -0.081 0.002    35.119* -0.544 0.047 
 (6.07) (-0.08) (-0.25)    (3.36) (-0.45) (-0.19) 
EU15 42.407 -1.505 0.035    45.738** -1.784 0.184 
 (1.87) (-0.63) (-0.05)    (3.81) (-1.64) (0.115) 
36.663** -0.547 0.022    40.585** -1.290 0.154 All 20 
countries (4.07) (-0.62) (-0.04)    (5.48) (-1.81) (0.107) 
 
Notes:  
- OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Significant at the .01 level; * significant at .05 level. 
- Correlation coefficient R2; adjusted R2 in parentheses 
-  Selected 28 countries panel (a): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA. 
- Selected 20 countries panel (b): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
 
Source: LIS (2009), OECD (2008), SOCX (2008), and own calculations
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